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ABSTRACT 
 
 In this paper, we discuss pros and cons of different models for financial market 
regulation and supervision and we present a proposal for the re-organisation of 
regulatory and supervisory agencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments are consistent 
with both new theories and effective behaviour of financial intermediaries in 
industrialized countries. Our proposed architecture for financial market regulation is 
based on the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different 
authorities, both at the domestic and the European level. According to this 
perspective, the three objectives of supervision – microeconomic stability, investor 
protection and proper behaviour, efficiency and competition – should be assigned to 
three distinct European authorities, each one at the centre of a European system of 
financial regulators and supervisors specialized in overseeing the entire financial 
market with respect to a single regulatory objective and regardless of the subjective 
nature of the intermediaries. Each system should be structured and organized 
similarly to the European System of Central Banks and work in connection with the 
central bank which would remain the institution responsible for price and 
macroeconomic stability.  We suggest a plausible path to build our 4-peak 
regulatory architecture in the Euro area. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  
Financial markets have significantly developed in the last decades throughout industrialized 
countries. This path is evident with regard to intermediaries, capital markets and financial 
instruments.  Structural changes have mainly involved the more traditional financial operators in 
banking, but have also interested investment firms and insurance companies. 
Accordingly, also the regulatory and supervisory1 arrangements of the financial system have 
been modified in  many countries. As a matter of fact, the topic is still at the centre of a lively 
debate, and the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, France and Japan are currently either 
undertaking or implementing radical reforms of their regulatory systems. In other European 
countries, evolutionary trends are moving in the same direction. Moreover, with the start of Phase 
III of the EMU, the responsibility for monetary policy in the Euro zone has been assigned to the 
European Central Bank, while banking and financial supervision tasks have been left to domestic 
agencies. A relevant novelty in Europe is then “the abandonment of the coincidence between the 
area of jurisdiction of monetary policy and the area of jurisdiction of banking supervision”2. The 
“double separation” (geographical and functional) between central banking and banking 
supervision, and the absence of any explicit reference to “who takes care of financial stability” in 
Europe, have cast some doubts about the efficacy of the current regulatory arrangements in 
preventing and managing financial crisis and are currently stimulating discussion in both academic 
and institutional circles. 
At the same time, the increasing integration of financial markets and especially the 
(attempted) alliances among exchanges raise the question of the eventual creation of a European 
SEC (Karmel, 1999, Wise Men, 2000). Furthermore, the increasing cross-border mergers among 
banks, securities and insurance firms, highlight the difficulties of keeping regulation and 
supervision at a national level, eventually with different agencies in charge of banks, securities and 
insurance firms. 
At the EU level, the Financial Services Action Plan (COM 1999, 232, 11.5.1999) maps out a 
first set of improvements to the EU legislative framework for securities markets. In the meanwhile 
the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets has been appointed 
by the Council of the European Union in July 2000 and released its Initial Report (Wise Men, 2000) 
                                                 
1
 Regulation deals with the formation of rules, primary and secondary: generally, primary rules are part of legislation 
and thus are approved by national Parliaments while secondary rules may be implemented by administrative bodies such 
as agencies. Supervision deals with the enforcement of rules both ex ante (control) and ex post (sanctions). 
2
 Padoa Schioppa, 1999.  On the pros and cons of separating monetary policy and banking supervisory tasks see 
Goodhart and Shoenmaker (1992) and Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999). 
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on November 9th, 2000, indicating a 4-step approach to make improvements in the EU regulation of 
securities markets (broad framework principles; implementation of these principles through a new 
EU Securities Committee; implementation of Community law by Member States within the 
framework of strengthened cooperation and networking between national regulators; stronger work 
by the EU Commission to ensure open and fair competition in the European financial markets). 
The objective of the present work is to set up a proposal for the reorganization of regulatory 
arrangements and supervisory agencies in financial markets in the European Union.  
The paper starts with a section investigating objectives and theoretical models for the 
regulation of the financial system3. We then describe recent evolutionary dynamics in financial 
markets, intermediaries and instruments and we argue that the current domestic-based and different 
frameworks for financial market regulation in a single currency area are not appropriate.  
Hence, we present a proposal for a new configuration for supervising the domestic financial 
market through the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities. This 
perspective would thus entrust the attainment of the three objectives of supervision on the entire 
financial market -- stability, investor protection (transparency), competition -- to three distinct 
authorities regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries, whether they be in banking, 
finance or insurance4. It would highlight the objective of competition in the financial sector as an 
important finality explicitly monitored by the regulator. For the sake of consistency, the existing 
rules applying to other forms of financial intermediation would be extended to include the life 
insurance sector. 
The natural choice to make is between centralized or decentralized regulation. After 
discussing the pros and cons of the two approaches, we suggest a two-level architecture for financial 
market regulation which is inspired by the current organization of the European System of Central 
Banks. We suggest to establish a European System of Financial Regulators, with three distinct 
independent authorities (plus the ECB) at the European level.  These agencies ought to be 
characterized by homogeneous procedures in terms of their creation, functioning and funding. They 
will push and coordinate the work of the three corresponding national authorities in each member 
country.  At both the European and domestic level, a coordination committee would be the site for 
resolving conflicts and controversies. 
An important issue in our proposal for a regulatory reform in the Euro area concerns the 
problem of who takes care of financial stability from a macroeconomic point of view in the Euro 
                                                 
3
 See also Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 1992; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Merton and Bodie, 1995; Goodhart 1996; 
White, 1997; Llewellyn (1999).  
4
 The reference is, in the following, to life-insurance, whose behaviour is very close to the other financial intermediaries. 
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area. We re-examine the matter of the need for a lender of last resort and of the proper relationship 
of the European Central Bank with other financial market regulators.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe the objectives and the 
motivations for  financial markets regulation and we identify four models of regulatory structure. In 
section III we deal with the regulatory frameworks currently in place in the Euro area and we argue 
that these are not suitable in a single-currency highly integrated area.  We then present in section IV 
our hypothesis of reform based on a fully coherent application of the supervisory model by 
objectives (or by finality). Finally, we summarize our conclusions.    
 
II.  MODELS FOR FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION AND SUPERVISION. 
II.1 Financial Market Regulation. 
The theoretical underpinning for public intervention in economic matters is traditionally 
based on the need to correct market imperfections and unfair distribution of the resources. Three 
more general objectives of public intervention derive thereby: the pursuit of stability, equity in the 
distribution of resources and the efficient use of those resources. 
The regulation of the financial system can be viewed as a particularly important case of 
public control over the economy. The accumulation of capital and the allocation of financial 
resources constitute an essential aspect in the process of the economic development of a nation. The 
peculiarities of financial intermediation and of the operators who perform this function justify the 
existence of a broader system of controls with respect to other forms of economic activity. Various 
theoretical motivations have been advanced to support the opportunity of a particularly stringent 
regulation for banks and other financial intermediaries. Such motivations are based on the existence 
of particular forms of market failure in the credit and financial sectors5 . 
 
The objectives of financial market regulation. 
The definition of the term 'financial market' has traditionally included the banking, financial 
and insurance segments. The bounds dividing institutions, instruments and markets were clear-cut, 
so that further distinctions were drawn within the different classes of intermediaries (with banks 
                                                 
5
 White (1996) identifies certain categories of "market failure", describing them with special regard for the financial 
markets: i) situations of market power brought about because of collusion, concentration, technological conditions or 
public regulatory conditions; ii) economies of scale, as in the case of capital markets where an inverse relation exists 
between the volume of transactions and the costs of transaction; iii) externality (spill-over) effects, as in the case of a 
bank failure generally affecting the confidence of savers in the entire banking system; iv) public good problems, as in 
the case of the property of prices formed on the exchanges; v) information asymmetries, typically found among buyers 
and sellers of financial products; vi) individuals who are unable to know their own best interest, as in the case of forms 
of savings they are "unacquainted with" present in financial markets. 
 5 
specialized in short or medium/long term maturities, functional/commercial operations, deposits and 
investments; with financial intermediaries handling broker-dealer negotiations, asset management 
and advisory functions, and with insurance companies dealing in life and other insurance policies). 
These distinctions were mirrored in the regulatory structure with different agencies for banks (often 
the Central Bank), securities and insurance firms at a national and international level (Basel 
Committee for Banking Supervision, International Organization of Securities Commissions, 
IOSCO,  and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, IAIS). 
 In this essay, as the bounds dividing the various types of financial institutions are becoming 
increasingly blurred (Corrigan, 1987), we shall refer to the financial market as an economic space 
wherein operators of various kinds -- banks, financial intermediaries, mutual funds, insurance 
companies, pension funds -- offer financial instruments and services. 
A primary objective of financial market regulation is the pursuit of macroeconomic and 
microeconomic stability. Safeguarding of the stability of the system translates into macro-controls 
over currencies, interest rates and payment systems which are functions, together with the lender of 
last resort function typical of the entities which are in charge of monetary policy: the central banks. 
Measures pertaining to the micro-stability (prudential regulation) of the intermediaries can be 
subdivided into two categories: general rules on the stability of all business enterprises and 
entrepreneurial activities, such as the legally required amount of capital, borrowing limits and 
integrity requirements; and more specific rules due to the special nature of financial intermediation, 
such as risk-based capital ratios, limits to portfolio investments and the regulation of off-balance 
activities, the managing of deposit insurance funds or investor compensation schemes. Furthermore 
micro-stability controls can be directed to the financial exchanges, clearing houses and securities 
settlement systems. 
A second objective of financial regulation is transparency in the market and of 
intermediaries and investor protection. This is linked to the more general objective of equity in the 
distribution of the available resources and may be mapped into the search for "equity in the 
distribution of information as a precious good" among operators.6 At the macro level, transparency 
                                                 
6
 One of the classic instances of market failure is relative to the presence of information asymmetries. However, some 
recent theories of financial intermediation (Allen and Santomero, 1997) seem to go beyond theories based on 
information: a look at reality in fact shows that while transaction costs and asymmetric information have greatly 
decreased, the activity of intermediation has considerably increased.  Financial markets seem to be more and more  
markets for intermediaries than for investors or firms. The nature of all financial intermediaries (not only banks, but also 
mutual funds, financial intermediaries, financial firms, pension funds) seems to be that of operators who perform risk 
management activities on behalf of third parties and decrease the "costs of participation" in the financial market: these 
two aspects have not yet been the object of in-depth analysis by intermediation theorists.  These same two motivations 
are thought to contribute to the building of long-term relationships between intermediaries and customers in such a way 
that the latter avoid ex ante research costs by simply buying the implicit insurance supplied by the intermediaries (Allen 
 6 
rules impose equal treatment (for example, rules regarding takeovers and public offers) and the 
correct dissemination of information (insider trading, manipulation and, more generally, the rules 
dealing with exchanges microstructure and price-discovery mechanisms). At the micro level, such 
rules aim at non-discrimination in relationships among intermediaries and different customers 
(conduct of business rules). 
A third objective of financial market regulation, linked with the general objective of 
efficiency, is the safeguarding and promotion of competition in the financial intermediation sector. 
This requires rules for controlling the structure of competition in the markets and, at the micro level, 
regulations in the matter of concentrations, cartels and abuse of dominant positions.   
Specific controls over financial intermediation are justified by the forms that competition 
can assume in that field. They are related to the promotion of competition as well as to limiting 
possible destabilizing excesses generated by competition itself.7  
 
II.2 Financial Market Supervisory Models. 
There is neither a unique theoretical model nor just one practical approach to the regulation 
and supervision of financial markets. Significant differences are found in the literature in terms of 
both definition and classification of regulatory models and techniques. 
We identify four approaches for financial market supervision and regulation: "institutional 
supervision", "supervision by objectives", "functional supervision" and "single-regulator 
supervision".  
 Institutional supervision. 
In the more traditional "institutional approach" (also known as "sectional" or "by subjects" or 
"by markets"), supervision is performed over each single category of financial operator (or over 
each single segment of the financial market) and is assigned to a distinct agency for the entire 
complex of activities.  In this model, which follows the traditional segmentation of the financial 
system into three markets, we thus have three supervisory authorities acting as watchdogs over, 
respectively, banks, financial intermediaries and mutual funds, and insurance companies (and the 
corresponding markets). The authorities control intermediaries and markets through entry selection 
processes (e.g., authorizations and enrolling procedures in special registers), constant monitoring of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and Gale, 1998).  
7
 On more than one occasion the European Commission has reaffirmed the applicability to financial markets of the 
general regulation on competition. The Court of Justice has also upheld such orientation. 
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the business activities (controls, inspections and sanctions) and eventual exits from the market 
(suspensions or removal)8 . 
“Institutional” regulation facilitates the effective realization of controls, being performed 
with regards to subjects that are regulated as to every aspect of their activity and as to all the 
objectives of regulation. Each intermediary and market has only one supervisory authority as a 
counterpart. The latter, in turn, is highly specialized.  As a result, duplication of controls is avoided 
and the costs of regulation can be considerably reduced.  
The institutional approach seems to be particularly effective in cases of intermediaries of a 
very similar type and that do operate in just one of the three traditional segments of financial 
intermediation.  Vice versa, the institutional model may give rise, in the presence of more subjects 
entitled to perform the same financial intermediation activities9, to distortions in the supervisory 
activity caused by the enforcement of different dispositions for operations of the same nature that 
are executed by different entities. The disadvantages of this approach are represented by the 
previously mentioned trend toward multiple-sector activities and by the progressive de-
specialization of the intermediaries. In turn, these phenomena are connected to the growing 
integration of both markets and instruments, that frequently leads to the building of large financial 
conglomerates.  In a context where the boundaries separating the various institutions are 
progressively being erased, it is no longer possible to establish whether a particular subject is a 
bank, a non-banking intermediary or an insurance company; or whether a group is involved more in 
one or another of such activities. Therefore, there is the risk that "parallel" systems of intermediaries 
may be created, reflecting the diversity of the respective control authorities. In this case, the way the 
controls are set up may become a destabilizing rather than stabilizing factor. Moreover, the 
intermediaries might be induced to choose their juridical status in a way which is contingent on the 
different rules that discipline different subjects. 
A further possible element of weakness in the model lies in the fact that when a single 
authority supervises a category of subjects and pursues more than one objective, the result of the 
control activity might not be effective in the event that different objectives are in conflict10 . 
                                                 
8
 As an example of the institutional approach, one can consider the regulatory system provided for the insurance market 
and intermediaries in many European countries by specific Insurance Supervisory Agencies.  
9
 Consider the negotiating activity in the stock exchange performed by both banks and financial intermediaries, or else 
the gathering of savings realized by life insurance companies, similar to that undertaken by mutual funds. 
10
 The classic example is the trade-off between the objective of stability and that of competition. In Italy for example the 
two tasks are under the responsibility of the central bank in the banking sector, a striking anomaly which is unique in 
the Euro area. We do not think that there is any motivation nowadays to give antitrust responsibility in banking to a 
different institution from the one (l’Autorità Garante per la Concorrenza ed il Mercato) that controls over this feature in 
all other economic sectors.  The original rationale was to be found in the fact that the Antitrust Authority was 
established only recently in Italy (1990). In absence of such an institution, the possibility that dominant coalitions and 
 8 
Supervision by objectives. 
The supervisory model by objectives (or by finalities) postulates that all intermediaries and 
markets be subjected to the control of more than one authority, each single authority being 
responsible for one objective of regulation regardless of both the legal form of the intermediaries 
and of the functions or activities they perform. According to this scheme, an authority, different 
from the Central Banks, in charge for monetary policy and macro-stability, is to watch over 
prudential regulation and micro-stability of both markets and all intermediaries, whether in banking, 
finance or insurance; another authority will be responsible for the transparency of financial markets 
and will control the behaviour of banks, financial intermediaries and insurance companies toward 
customers; a third authority will guarantee and safeguard competition over the entire financial 
market and among intermediaries11 .  
The basic advantage of this 4-peak model (recently chosen in Australia) lies in the fact that it 
is particularly effective in a highly-integrated market context and in the presence of poli-functional 
operators, conglomerates and groups operating in a variety of different business sectors. At the same 
time, it does not require an excessive proliferation of control units.  
The most attractive feature of this scheme is that it provides uniform regulation for the 
different entities engaged in the same activities: for examples ATS and exchanges, banks issuing 
bonds. 
Compared to the "institutional" model, a regulatory framework organized by objectives may 
produce a certain degree of multiplication of the controls. And sometimes it could lead to a lack of 
certain controls.  Indeed, the specific assignment of competencies with respect to the objectives of 
regulation is not necessarily univocal and all-inclusive in practice. In such a model, each 
intermediary is subject to the control of more than one authority, and this may be more costly. The 
                                                                                                                                                                  
excessive market power could arise in the banking sector was considered too dangerous and justified the assignment of 
the task of preserving competition in the market to the already existing institution controlling the banking system for 
prudential supervision.  Today, however, no reason remains to assign the same objective of regulation to different 
Institutions in different sectors. Moreover, it is logically incoherent to assign responsibility for competition in one 
sector to the same institution that is responsible for the stability of the same sector. An obvious conflict emerges 
between the two objectives. As a matter of fact, in many of the M&A operations in the Italian banking sector, the 
opinions of the Antitrust Authority (which are not compelling) and those of the Bank of Italy have been opposite 
(Cafagna and Sciolli, 1996).  The Authority which is responsible for the stability of the system could indeed have a 
regulatory bias for the protection of firms that should be left to exit the market. The usual motivation of the risk of 
contagion and of investors protection would be advocated.  However, we think that the risk of contagion is not 
necessarily and inevitably linked to all single bank crisis. Moreover, this risk could be countered with other 
instruments, including more transparency and information diffusion in the market. 
11
 In the Italian system, the supervisory model by objectives has found application, at least nominally, in the Finance 
Law “Testo Unico delle disposizioni in materia di intermediazione finanziaria” (DL 58/1998) where it is established, 
with reference to intermediaries, that the competent authority in the matter of risk containment and financial stability is 
the Banca d'Italia, while the Consob is responsible for transparency and proper behavior, but only with reference to 
investment services. 
 9 
intermediaries might in fact be required to produce several reports relating to supervision, often 
containing identical or similar information.  At the same time, the intermediaries may have to justify 
the same action to a whole set of authorities contemporaneously, even though for different reasons.  
Vice versa, a deficit of controls might occur whenever the exact areas of responsibility are not 
clearly identifiable in specific cases. 
Functional  Supervision. 
The third regulatory model is the so-called "functional supervision”, or supervision “by 
activity".  It considers as "given" the economic functions performed in the financial system; unlike 
other lines of thought regarding supervisory activities, this approach does not postulate that existing 
institutions, whether operative12 or regulatory13 , must necessarily continue to exist as such, in terms 
of both their structure and role.  The "functions" or activities undertaken are considered to be more 
stable than the institutions that perform them. Competition among financial systems is thought to 
drive existing institutions to evolve in a dynamic perspective in the direction of new and more 
efficient forms.  
According to Merton and Bodie (1995), the financial system is considered to perform six 
basic functions: 
- to provide ways of clearing and settling payments in order to facilitate trade;   
- to provide a mechanism for the pooling of resources and for portfolio diversification; 
- to provide ways of transferring economic resources through time, across borders, and among 
industries;   
- to provide ways of managing risks; 
- to provide price information to help coordinate decentralized decision making in the various 
sectors of the economy; 
- to provide ways of dealing with the incentive problems created when one party in a transaction has 
information that the other party does not have or when one party acts as agent for another. 
 
In the functional supervisory model, each type of such financial services should be regulated 
by a given authority independently of the operator who offers it. Hence, also this approach has the 
important advantage that it calls for the same rules to be applied to intermediaries who perform the 
same activity of financial intermediation even though such operators may fall into different 
categories from a legal standpoint.  For example, activities including investment management, the 
                                                 
12
 Banks, mutual funds, intermediation firms, insurance companies and other financial intermediaries. 
13
 Bodies for controlling stability, supervisory organs to guarantee transparency, antitrust authorities and other 
supervisory agencies. 
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gathering of deposits, lending, and savings invested in insurance/retirement funds are each subject 
to homogeneous rules established by individual authorities, which independently supervise such 
activities regardless of the institutions engaged. This approach fosters economies of specialization 
within the supervisory authorities and might represent a rather attractive solution for the regulation 
of integrated, advanced financial markets. However, it is not without drawbacks. This model 
envisions an overlapping of bodies controlling the same subject: there is the risk of an excessive 
division of competencies among the regulatory agencies.14  
A further disadvantage of the functional approach is that finally what is subject to failure is 
not the activity performed, but the institution.  In case of serious problems of stability, it would be 
essential to guarantee protection and oversight with regard to the institutions rather than to 
individual operations (Padoa-Schioppa, 1988).   
"Single-regulator supervision”. 
The single-regulator supervisory model is based on just one control authority, separated from 
the central bank, and with responsibility over all markets and intermediaries regardless of whether 
in the banking, financial or insurance sector. This authority would be concerned with all the 
objectives of regulation (stability, transparency and investor protection, maybe competition). 
In the regulatory practice, the centralized supervisory model has typically characterized early 
stages of financial system development, often in periods when the central bank was the only 
institution that supervised the activity of financial intermediaries. Faced in recent times with the 
globalization and integration of the markets, the English brought this model back into being with the 
creation of the Financial Services Authority - FSA (See Briault, 1999).15  The British executive's 
decision to merge the pre-existent supervisory authorities – part of the Central Bank staff, the 
Securities Investment Board, the directorship of the Department of Trade and Industry competent in 
the insurance field and the Security Regulatory Organizations (SROs) -- in the FSA is based on the 
search for a more efficient organization of regulatory activities including a reduction in the costs of 
                                                 
14
 Oldfield and Santomero (1997) view financial institutions as a set including banks, insurance companies, investment 
companies (open and closed funds, other forms of collective investment, pension funds), origination firms (investment 
firms, credit institutions, insurance brokers and financial promoters), market-makers (specialists, dealers and reinsurance 
companies), stock exchanges (cash and derivatives), clearing houses and other financial operators. The services 
provided by these financial institutions can be classified in six different activities: origination (identification, evaluation 
and creation of financial activities originating with the customers of an institution), distribution (the collection of funds 
through the sale of new financial products), servicing (the management of payments flow from financial activities issuers 
to holders), packaging (pooling and tailoring of financial activities to fit the specific needs of customers through greater 
personalization of goods and services offered), intermediating (setting up of financial activities and contemporaneous 
buy-back of different financial activities on the part of the same intermediary), market making (purchase or sale of 
financial activities).  In a regulatory perspective this taxonomy might lead to an arrangement wherein every activity 
would correspond to a different supervisory activity. 
15
 The single-regulator model was first developed in Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) more than a decade 
ago. See Taylor and Fleming (1999). 
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regulation itself. Also, it was considered useful to have just one agency accountable to the 
Parliament and to the market16 .  
The advantages of this approach lie in the economies of scale that it produces. Fixed costs 
and logistical expenses, the costs of administrative personnel and the compensation for the top 
management are all considerably reduced. Moreover, this scheme calls for a unified view which is 
particularly useful and effective with respect to poli-functional groups and conglomerates.  By the 
same token, the costs of supervision charged to the subjects regulated and/or to the taxpayer 
decrease, and there is less room for “regulatory arbitrage”.   
However, the validity of this model depends to a high degree on its internal organization: if 
the numerous areas of competence and specialization are not well-structured and coordinated, the 
risk is to slow the decision-making process.  As underlined by Wilson (1989), what counts is a clear 
definition of the agency's "mission".  Also, the presence of a sole regulator might render collusive 
relations more immediate and direct (“regulatory capture”). Finally, it might exacerbate problems of 
self-contradiction in the event that the authority should find itself forced to pursue conflicting 
supervisory objectives.  This sort of problem might in part be overcome thanks to an internal 
organization divided "by objectives", but the fact that there is only one top management would end 
up in the prevalence of a single objective as final consequence of the decision-making process. 
 
II.3  Is There an Optimal Model for Supervision? 
Our presentation of the main regulatory models of the financial system should have made 
clear how hard it is to establish which alternative offers a decisively superior arrangement.  In real 
life we find a prevalence of "mixed" approaches which borrow in heterogeneous fashion elements 
that are proper to more than just one model. 
The institutional model could be considered a good candidate only in a context with rigidly 
separated financial segments, and where no global players are at stake. Nowadays, we think that this 
picture does not apply to the major advanced countries, where we do observe high integration in 
financial markets and intermediaries and a strong presence of polifunctional groups and 
conglomerates (see CEPS, 2000).   
The most evident problems with regard to the functional supervisory model are the 
following: i) it might call for too many regulators, corresponding to the numerous functions and 
activities that the intermediaries perform; ii) it does not explicitly address questions regarding the 
stability (possible failures) of the single institutions. 
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 The costs of the FSA are funded directly by the market through a system of contributions and taxes charged to the 
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Hence, we think that modern financial systems should rely on either a single regulator or  
independent agencies, each one responsible for one of the three objectives of regulation.  
However, we are particularly concerned with the possible conflict of interest in pursuing 
different objectives when these are assigned to the same agency. Clearly, the "single-regulator" 
model is truly affected by the possible incompatibility among the supervisory objectives.17 In the 
credit sector, for instance, we find a clear trade-off between competition and stability (at least in the 
short run). The need to safeguard stability led, particularly in moments of economic and financial 
tension, to the use of instruments designed to limit competition, such as institutional barriers to 
entry in the market, or to the legal imposition of limits to operative activities. In financial systems 
where banks are prevalent but not efficient enough to compete cross-border, the objective of 
competition is usually sacrificed more easily than that of macroeconomic stability.  The 
consequence is a “stable” environment in terms of the number and identity of the intermediaries. 
But this is obtained by altering the free play of competition through measures that prevent exit of 
inefficient actors from the market. 
The UK example is interesting. According to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
FSA has 4 regulatory objectives which can be reconducted to prudential regulation and investor 
protection: market confidence, public awareness, the protection of consumers, the reduction of 
financial crime. Apparently there is no reference to the efficiency objective. But (Section 2(3)), “in 
discharging its general functions the Authority must have regard to: …; the desirability of 
maintaining the competitive position of the United Kingdom” which seems to be more an objective 
of a policy maker rather than the one of a super partes regulator and supervisor.  
Another case is that of the possible conflict between the objectives of stability and 
transparency. Again with regard to the banking sector, scarce transparency in fund gathering 
activities (e.g., in the issue of securities) might allow the application of interest rates below market 
rates.  Such behavior could be considered functional to the strengthening of the stability of banks, 
but it would result in direct injury to investors. 
The most immediate response to this important problem might be to attribute to different 
authorities different objectives of supervision, that is to adopt the regulatory model by objectives as 
the benchmark for advanced financial systems. This solution could be designed so as to avoid an 
excessive proliferation of authorities and thus limit the increase in both direct and indirect costs of 
regulation18 .  This solution, in order to be effective and to avoid the conflict of interest among the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
supervised institutions. 
17
 Moreover, the single- regulator model could also lead to excessive concentration of regulatory powers. 
18
 The literature available to date is not vast. See Franks, Schaefer and Staunton (1997) for an empirical work on the 
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different objectives, should be accompanied by a coordination committee participated by the 
members of the three different authorities and, eventually, of the central bank. 
 
 
III.  CURRENT REGULATORY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EURO AREA 
III.1  Integration Among Intermediaries, Markets and Instruments. 
As already mentioned, banking, securities and insurance segments are becoming increasingly 
integrated in terms of markets, intermediaries and financial instruments. The boundaries separating 
banking, securities and insurance activities are in fact on their way out in most developed financial 
systems because of the strong process of technological, geographical and functional integration 
among these three sectors; and as a consequence of the de-specialization of the intermediaries. The 
"reserved activities" that characterized financial operators by type are constantly decreasing at both 
the normative and operative level.  As a matter of fact the traditional tripartite division of the 
financial market failed to take into consideration that the creation and allocation of savings among 
sectors with a cash surplus and sectors with a cash deficit were basically unitary phenomena: hence, 
a unitary view of financial intermediation and its regulation should be adopted. 
In the Euro area, the processes of integration within the financial market have come about in 
a rather articulated fashion and following quite heterogeneous paths.    
As regards the intermediaries, ownership integration has been accentuated, coming about 
through the transfer of capital shares among institutions, or among controlling and controlled firms, 
through an increasing number of M&As and through the establishment of new alliances directed to 
diversify, either geographically or functionally, the business.19 Even though the process is still 
characterized by a dominant share of domestic deals, cross-border operations have recently become 
more important and are likely to develop further in the near future.  The prominent role of 
traditional banks in continental Europe is currently being challenged by the advances in information 
and delivery technology and the entry of new and aggressive players in the financial industry. While 
the former has the main effect of lowering barriers to entry in the banking and financial industry, the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
direct and indirect costs of the regulation of financial markets, which among other things evidences the absence of 
research on the benefits of regulation.   
19
 A peculiar form of integration among intermediaries might also be detected in the transformation of their legal status, 
even when continuing to perform basically the same intermediation activities as before. This occurred in particular with 
investment firms which have been legally transformed into banks in countries where banks have traditionally benefited 
from competitive rents due to higher regulatory protection; and even though such firms did not have as their primary 
objective the issue of deposits or the provision of loans.  The reasons for this "arbitrage" among legally diverse forms 
include the access to credit of last resort and to the inter-bank liquidity market, the possibility of directly managing 
customers’ liquidity, the concerns about a sounder image ("too bank to fail"), the differing modalities for crisis 
management, and different regulatory costs and different supervisory authorities to deal with. 
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latter contribute to erode banks’ monopoly and comparative advantages in information, monitoring, 
delivery capacity and processing by tending to specialize in particular segments of the financial 
business (brokerage on-line, retail insurance and financial services), and/or targeting certain 
categories of customers. The existence of more severe regulation in banking has also the 
consequence that banks meet more difficulties in diversifying their activities out of finance, with 
respect to the new entrants in the banking business. At the same time, less protection is gradually 
given to traditional banks as the process of de-regulation gains power and support in the industry.  
European financial market liberalization did also start a deep process of business restructuring in the 
banking sector. The search for scale economies led to a reduced number of banks and a considerable 
increase in market concentration. Financial conglomerates and complex groups have become 
gradually more important and tend to act more and more on an international basis and at a European 
and global level. 
The role of insurance companies as financial intermediaries is also constantly increasingly, 
thanks to contracts involving life insurance and capitalization, whose services are directly tied to 
investment funds or to stock exchange or other financial indices (so-called unit-linked or index-
linked contracts). Nowadays, the inclusion of the life insurance segment among those activities 
subject to financial regulation is something accepted in the major financial systems. Over the last 
few years, market changes have actually lessened the distinctiveness of some schemes of life 
insurance compared to other financial products.20  
As regards the markets, considerable integration has taken place between the 
banking/insurance markets and the securities markets. In many countries, this occurred by virtue of 
the issue and quotation on the stock exchanges or other securities markets of both banks and 
insurance companies.21 Also financial products and instruments have experienced a certain degree 
                                                 
20
 In the English system, for instance, long-term life insurance contracts are included in the notion of investment 
(financial instruments) as provided by the Financial Services Act of 1986. This law and its implementing rules regulate 
the selling of long-term business (life and pensions, see also Boléat, 1998). Insurance companies have the same 
treatment of unit trusts in terms of their selling activity. The recent establishment of the FSA will further reduce the 
distinctiveness of insurance companies by applying a common regulation to all financial institutions. In the U.S. system, 
variable annuities and variable life insurance contracts whose yield is tied to “separate accounts”23 fall under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, which provides the general guidelines relative to investment activities, reinvestment, 
and the buying and selling of financial securities. Besides, as contract owners assume certain investment risks under 
variable contracts, the contracts are securities under the Securities Act of 1933. In the Euro area, on the contrary, 
insurance companies are generally excluded from the set of rules that apply to banks and to other financial 
intermediaries. In most countries life insurance policies are not considered financial instruments and insurance 
companies are not authorised to perform investment services. Although there is an increasing tendency to recognise the 
high degree of contiguity between certain insurance products and typical financial products, the regulatory differences 
remain significant and insurance companies are supervised and controlled by a specialized supervisory authority (with 
the exception of Austria and Ireland where responsibility is given to a government department). In the Maastricht 
Treaty, it is also explicitly forbidden that the ECB could intervene in and regulate the insurance  field.  
21
 As an example, the Italian financial market is experiencing a peculiar progressive coincidence between issuers and 
financial intermediaries. Data on stock exchange capitalization indicate that the weight of the financial sectors in the 
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of integration, as many of these - even when keeping the same legal status - have rapidly either 
partially or totally changed their economic function. This is due to both exogenous factors -- such as 
fiscal considerations, or different regulations applied to similar financial tools – and to endogenous 
factors -- such as the different behavior of sellers and buyers (here we refer in particular to 
certificates of deposit and bonds issued by banks, and to certain types of life insurance policies). In 
general financial products have become increasingly complex, calling for new and enhanced skills 
in regulatory and supervisory activities. 
Furthermore, EMU increased the level of substitutability between debt and, to a less extent, 
equity instruments given that country interest factors should disappear, even if sovereign risk may, 
in theory still exist. The Euro is impacting the demand side of the stock-exchanges’ business, by 
making them more and more quasi perfect substitutes even if the most important exchange in 
Europe, the London stock exchange, belongs to a non-Euro country and there remain a sufficient 
number of regulatory and fiscal differences between EMU countries. Euro reduces spreads between 
countries and induces investors to price macro risk with a pan-European index and further 
decompose remaining risk along sector rather than country, bringing reorganization of the asset 
management industry (Cybo Ottone, Di Noia and Murgia, 2000).   
 
III.2 The Regulatory Models. 
In each country of the Euro-system, financial markets regulation has been affected by the 
structure and the evolution of the domestic financial system as well as by the legal system in place. 
In general regulation was primarily focused on banking intermediaries, given their traditional 
dominant role in the financial sector.22  Most of the recent changes have been induced in member 
countries under the pressure of the EC directives and of increasing cross-border financial market 
integration which first stimulated and then followed the important 1992 single market program. A 
part form the member countries’ implicit commitment to ensure that single financial sectors were 
adequately regulated and supervised, however, no European law deals with the problem of how 
regulating and supervising financial markets and intermediaries. As a consequence, the current 
picture in the Euro area is that of a combination of the different regulatory approaches described in 
section 2, but with a still prominent role for the traditional “institutional” model.  In the European 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Italian stock market is much higher in 1998 (42.4% of market capitalization) than in other advanced countries (18.2% in 
the US, 26.4% in France, 33.7% in Germany, 26.9% in the UK, 18.2% in Japan. Source: IRS, Rapporto sul Mercato 
Azionario 1999).  
22
 Still in 1998, evaluated in billions of Euro, the nominal value of equity and bond markets in the US was much higher 
than in the Eurosystem, with figures of respectively 11,000 and more than 12,000 with respect to about 3,300 and 6,000 
in the Euro area. However, in terms of commercial bank assets, the Eurosystem countries summed up to about 14,000 
billions of Euro (1997 data) against the 4,000 of the US. See CEPS, 2000.   
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Union, only the Nordic countries (in particular Denmark and Sweden) and recently the UK have 
moved to a single supervisor. The central bank is often responsible for banking supervision, even 
though there are cases (Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland and partially France) in which this 
task is assigned to a separate agency; securities are regulated and supervised by a specialized agency 
in most countries, and the same seems to apply to the insurance sector.  
 The regulatory agencies also differ in terms of their funding, working and appointment 
procedures. In particular, there are cases in which the cost is partly (or totally) beared by the 
supervised entities (as the banking supervisor in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and Finland) and 
cases in which it is mostly coming from the public budget.  Table 1 summarizes the current 
structure of supervision in the European Union. 
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Table 1: Supervision in Banking, Securities and Insurance in the EU 
Country Banking Securities Insurance 
Belgium BS BS I 
Denmark U U U 
Germany B B,S I 
Greece CB S I 
Ireland CB CB G 
Italy CB* CB, S I 
Luxembourg BS BS I 
France B,CB B,S I 
Spain CB S I 
Netherlands CB CB, S I 
Portugal CB CB, S I 
Austria G G G 
Finland BS BS I 
Sweden U U U 
United Kingdom U U U 
Sources: ECB (Monthly Bullettin, April 2000), Lannoo (2000). 
Legenda: CB: Central Bank, BS: banking and securities supervisor, B: banking supervisor, 
S: securities supervisor, I: insurance supervisor, G: government department, U: single financial supervisor.   
* In Italy the Central bank is also the authority responsible for antitrust in the banking sector.  
 
III.3  Is Domestic Regulation Still Good? 
Our previous description of the recent evolution in European financial markets and products 
should have made clear that the trend is towards the emergence of Europe as the home market of at 
least the most important financial institutions. The single currency will only speed up a naturally 
ongoing process to further market integration and towards financial conglomeration. Supervising 
groups is not necessarily a minor challenge for regulators.  If it is true that risk diversification might 
be at reach, there is also the possibility of excessive risk concentration, expecially when a domestic- 
based regulator looses control over the many internationally linked activities of the supervised 
entities.  Risks at group level do not always coincide with the sum of individual risks. Moreover, 
larger balances allow for more creative accounting.   
We think that there is no point in having a common monetary policy and aiming at an always 
more integrated financial system in the Euro area while keeping different financial regulations and 
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supervising rules in each member country. As a matter of fact, these institutional differences are an 
important barrier to further financial integration.  In this field, the principle of minimum 
harmonization and mutual recognition, that was originally thought to be able to naturally induce 
over time a convergence of regulatory behaviour and more uniform rules, clearly did not work.  
Moreover, there is a concrete risk that competition in this area will not even generate the more 
efficient outcome: on one side there exists an obvious incentive to promote less demanding 
domestic financial regulations and supervision in order to let the own country become more 
attractive for running financial business; while on the other side it is not clear who will pay the costs 
of potential insolvency following excessive risk taking behavior and financial misconduct in a 
member country (see below). Finally, with increasing international banking activities and a 
European real time gross settlement system in place (Target), the argument that domestic regulators 
and supervisors have better knowledge and can exercise more efficient control becomes day by day 
less effective (See Prati and Schinasi, 1999). 
 Another important point is that no clear tool nor any responsibility to counter and/or manage 
the risk of financial instability and crisis has been established in Europe.  The Treaty is silent on this 
topic. It is not even evident that the role of lender of last resort will be performed by the ECB, as it 
would be desirable being an essential function of a central bank. In fact, this solution will probably 
occur only in the case of a widely spread liquidity crisis affecting the whole Euro area.  But what 
will follow a liquidity crisis located in a single country?  And what a solvency crisis?  
 Suppose we face a situation in which a single financial institution located in a member 
country is in trouble. What kind of intervention, if any, is currently allowed?  One of the typical 
forms of public intervention seems lost, and probably the most natural, that of central bank last 
resort loans.  The ECB will not intervene in favour of a single institution, especially if its financial 
links are mostly domestic. Also because it could always assign some of the responsibility for the 
crisis to the domestic financial regulator-supervisor. The domestic central bank can not intervene by 
providing funds without an explicit authorization by the ECB. In this case, it will have to convince 
the latter that the institution is facing a liquidity and not a solvency crisis, according to the old 
Bagehot's doctrine,  and / or that the risk of potential spread and contagion of the crisis is high.23 
This requires time and resources. The other two traditional instruments, bail out through a safety net 
provided by the banking system or through the government budget will ultimately shift the burden 
on the shoulders of domestic taxpayers, especially in the framework established in the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Given the current level of taxes in Europe, this is hardly an optimal solution. 
                                                 
23
 See Freixas et al. (1999), De Cecco (1999) and Bruni and de Boisseu (2000).  
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III.4 More harmonization? 
We think that a much higher degree of co-ordination in the field of financial regulation and 
prudential supervision is both desirable and needed in the EMU. Our view is not limited to the 
banking system but embraces all financial intermediaries. 
A further harmonization in both regulation is needed as financial market integration goes on 
as we can see from (announced) M&A among stock exchanges, the development of internet as a 
means of performing financial services making location irrelevant, the increasing (attempted) cross-
border mergers among intermediaries, groups and conglomerates, the dual and cross-border 
offerings and listings of securities, etc. 
Not necessarily harmonization means full centralization. It seems too early for one (or more) 
central regulator (s) and supervisor (s). In fact not only the European Union is too large but still too 
many different rules exist (commercial codes, company laws, failure procedures, corporate 
governance) and fiscal policies is still not harmonized. In many cases, national enforcement might 
still be desirable. On the other side, as we have previously shown, it is too late for having only 
national regulators and supervisors. 
A somehow good example of international cooperation can already be found in the banking 
supervision, with the Basle Committee working on a wide range of topics with no formal by-laws, 
but a very strong leadership. Furthermore, at the EU level there exist many Institutional 
arrangements for the regulation and supervision of the financial sector: the most important are the 
Banking Advisory Committee and the Insurance Committee, both capable of Comitology powers 
(European Commission, 2000). Comitology refers to the delegation of implementing powers by the 
Council to the Commission for the execution of EU legislation: representatives of the member 
States, acting through Committees called “comitology committees”, assist the Commission in the 
execution of the implementing powers conferred on it (Wise Men, 2000). 
On the contrary, the securities supervision has succeeded in establishing neither a similar 
long record of international rule-making nor a Securities Committee capable of comitology powers. 
In a world of complete mobility of capital and financial services, where institutions and markets 
operate without frontiers, supervision should operate at the same level, that is to say, it must be 
structured internationally24 . The European supervisory system would gain both in consistency and 
effectiveness if all stability oriented rules, all transparency oriented rules and all competition 
                                                 
24
 This does not necessarily lead to the death of national securities supervisor and the creation of a European SEC (see 
Lannoo 1999, Karmel 1999, Onado, 1999), even though such hypothesis could become realistic in the medium run (see 
the Financial Services Action Plan and Wise Men, 2000). 
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oriented rules for all types of financial institutions were either issued or (better) coordinated by 
distinct independent agencies at the Euro level. 
 
 
IV.  REGULATION BY OBJECTIVE IN THE EURO AREA. 
In section 2, we argued in favour of the regulatory model by objectives. According to this 
view, while continuing to assign to the central bank the objective of price and macroeconomic 
stability, a separate agency should be in charge of micro stability. This should supervise the stability 
of the entire financial market and of single financial intermediaries whether in banking, securities or 
insurance26 (authorizations; professional registers; supervision in the area of information, 
regulations and inspections of intermediaries and conglomerates; other matters regarding stability; 
crises management). We think that this authority should also manage deposit insurance and the 
investor compensation scheme.27 This authority should cooperate with the central bank, which 
remain in charge of monetary policy and lender of last resort function, in supervising security 
settlement and payment systems and clearing houses; it could be charged with responsibility over 
financial instruments in wholesale markets, with particular regard to government bonds and 
derivatives. 
An authority responsible for transparency and investor protection should supervise 
disclosure requirements and the proper behavior of intermediaries and the orderly conduct of trading 
in all financial intermediation activities performed by banking, securities, and life insurance 
intermediaries (including discipline and control in the area of transparency in contracts). Moreover, 
this authority would be assigned powers in the area of misleading advertising by financial 
intermediaries. Finally, it should control macro-transparency in financial markets (including the 
discipline of insider trading, takeovers and public offers).  
A fourth authority (including the central bank) should guarantee fair competition, and should 
avoid abuses of dominant position and limit dangerous concentrations in banking, security and 
insurance sectors.  A non-binding opinion of the authority for stability might be contemplated in 
certain instances. 
                                                 
26
 We view as somehow problematic the different regulation currently given in most countries to life insurance firms, 
particularly when they act purely as financial intermediaries. As a matter of fact, the life insurance industry, throughout 
contracts such as unit and index-linked schemes, has been gradually losing its original distinctiveness. We think it 
should no longer be regulated as a different function from banking and financial investment, nor having its own 
regulator. 
27
 In fact, often the domestic agencies for deposit protection have no regulatory and supervisory powers at all, and they  
simply act as the cash management department of other regulating institutions when paying back depositors and 
investors. There are clearly cost reductions that could be achieved by their elimination. 
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A sketch of this “four-peak” model for financial regulation follows (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  A 4-Peak Model for Financial Regulation 
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In this paragraph, we will present an institutional proposal to modify the current regulatory 
architecture of the Eurosystem financial sector which is a simple application of the above model. 
We think that this could be considered a good candidate to solve some problematic issues regarding 
financial stability in the Euro area and the need for more coordinated transparency and investor 
protection rules. Of course, we are aware that it is not easy to structure and create such an integrated 
system of rules and institutions in the EU, that it will require time, resources, political support and a 
widespread collaborative attitude. Nevertheless, we hope at least to contribute to the current 
discussion in a constructive way. 25 
A first issue to tackle is whether financial regulation in the Euro area should be fully 
centralized at the European level, or only better harmonized but still maintained at a regional 
dimension.  
Many arguments support the view of centralizing and unifying financial regulation in the 
Eurosystem.  Increasing integration among financial markets goes along with implicit or exlicit 
mergers among exchanges and intermediaries, and involves dual and cross-border offerings and 
listings.  An integrated supervision on markets and intermediaries would be valuable in a scenario 
dominated by conglomerates and characterized by the expansion of electronic communication 
networks, market manipulation and trades on the net. At the same time, there is the need for 
enforcement at European level.   
However, the feasibility and opportunity of a European centralized solution is diminished by 
the observation that the Euro area might be too large to be controlled by a central agency, that many 
                                                 
25
 On these topics see also Padoa Schioppa, 1999; Lannoo, 1999; Vives, 1999. 
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different rules are still in place with respect to commercial codes, company laws, corporate 
governance schemes, failure procedures and so on. The EU directives, when they exist, do only 
establish a common floor; and even with a single currency and a common monetary policy, different 
fiscal policies are still in place, and taxation of both financial services and other items is not 
homogeneous in the Eurosystem. Some form of national enforcement is probably still needed. 
Hence, we propose to establish a European System of Financial Regulators (ESFR), 
structured similarly to the ESCB, and organized accordingly to the model of regulation by objective. 
A European Central Authority, separated by the ECB, should be at the centre of the system for each 
objective of regulation. In a first stage (3 years?), these authorities would harmonize and coordinate 
financial regulation in member countries, design common principles and guidelines for prudential 
supervision and set out appropriate disclosure instruments and requirements. They should sponsor 
the necessary institutional change at domestic level leading to merging and re-organization of 
supervisory and regulatory powers in the financial sector of each member country. At the end of the 
process, in each country there will be just one national agency responsible for each objective of 
financial market regulation. This national agency will participate to the definition of the general 
strategies and principles of financial regulation in the area, becoming a member of the ESFR. It will 
be responsible for the implementation in the domestic country of both the rules and the supervisory 
duties agreed upon at the Euro level.28  
This reform calls for establishing two new European Agencies, one responsible for the 
microeconomic stability (“European Financial Supervision Authority”) and one for transparency in 
the market, investor protection and disclosure requirements (“European Authority for Market 
Transparency”) of all financial intermediaries. These two central agencies should co-ordinate the 
different domestic agencies in each member country. A part form this vertical form of coordination, 
cooperation would be also desirable horizontally, at both the European and national levels. This 
coordination, and resolution of eventual controversies, could be provided by special Commissions 
for the Supervision of the Financial System (as in the Corrigan Report - Corrigan 1987) established 
at the European Commission and at national Treasuries. These commissions would be the natural 
place for activities involving proposals and consultation concerning measures regarding financial 
market regulation.   
No antitrust power will be given to any member of the ESFR, so as to avoid the trade-off 
between competition on one side and stability and transparency on the other. Moreover, agencies 
                                                 
28
 Both the national and the central European levels of financial supervisors should exist, given the current level of 
harmonization in the financial market legislation, which is far from complete, in particular with respect to taxation, 
accounting rules and banking crises management. 
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responsible for supervising market competition do exist at both Euro and domestic levels. We think 
that it would be wise to transform in a third separate and independent central agency the EU 
Antitrust DG. This will then coordinate and promote the harmonized activities of domestic Antitrust 
agencies. In each member state, the national Antitrust agency will safeguard competition in all 
economic sectors. 
 Our suggested 4 - peak model for financial regulation in Europe is sketched in figure 2. 
  
Figure 2:  European System of Financial Regulation 
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We are aware that our proposed architecture is very ambitious and requires indeed a 
substantial amount of coordination among the different authorities. Another important obstacle is 
the institutional and political resistance of the existing national bodies that would not easily accept 
to see their powers diminished or even abolished. 
For such reasons, although less satisfying from a theoretical point of view, a second best 
solution could be the creation of a single regulator, by merging the financial supervision authority 
and the market transparency agency into a single one. This kind of three-peak model could still be a 
good, and more practical solution to implement, especially in the medium run. In such a scheme, the 
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single European Central Agency for financial market regulation would cooperate with the ECB for 
the purpose of macroeconomic stability. It would also organize and coordinate the work of the 
various domestic agencies, which in different countries could be either specialized by objective or 
responsible for both market transparency and stability as the FSA in the UK. 
 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS. 
 In this paper we argued that financial market regulation should be re-designed and 
harmonized in Europe according to a regulatory model by “objectives” or “finalities”. This would 
call for assigning to three distinct and independent agencies (separated by, but coordinated with the 
central bank) all supervisory powers and regulatory responsibilities in financial markets and on 
financial intermediaries, regardless of these being insurance companies, banks or investment firms.  
One agency should be responsible for financial microstability, another for transparency and 
disclosure requirements, and the third for protection of competitive features in the markets.    
We are in favour of the establishment in the Euro area of two new European financial 
regulation agencies, each formally separated by the ECB. These agencies should be responsible for 
the comprehensive co-ordination of both legislation and execution of regulation in financial 
markets: the first European central agency should be responsible for the microeconomic stability of 
all intermediaries, while the second for transparency and disclosure requirements. The third 
objective of guaranteeing competition in financial (and non-financial) markets is already 
safeguarded by having the Antitrust General Direction of the European Commission plus the 
domestic agencies. It would be wise to transform in a central and independent European agency the 
EU Antitrust General Direction. The latter and the two newly created central agencies will be at the 
centre of three European Systems of Financial Regulators, each one structured similarly and 
working in connection to the ESCB, thereby requiring active participation of national agencies in 
member countries. A 4 - peak regulatory model “by objective” would be in place in the Euro Area 
as well as in each member country. 
However many difficulties are obvious. Even in case of a consensus on the final Architecture 
for FMR, it is difficult to design and follow a feasible political and institutional path to build it. 
Changes in the Maastricht Treaty are needed in order to establish new agencies and can be proposed 
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only in the next intergovernmental conference not before 2004. Changes in the legislations of each 
EU (or Euro)-countries are needed. There will be a strong political and institutional opposition. 
For sure there will not be any serious financial market integration without a greater political 
integration. 
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